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This	  study	  establishes	  a	  baseline	  upon	  which	  future	  analysis	  of	  the	  Jordan	  River	  conflict	  may	  
build,	  by	  investigating	  the	  hydropolitics	  of	  the	  river’s	  upper	  reaches.	  It	  reviews	  the	  record	  of	  
use	  and	  distribution	  of	  the	  transboundary	  flows,	  and	  finding	  these	  to	  be	  asymmetric	  in	  the	  
extreme,	  investigates	  how	  the	  inequity	  has	  been	  achieved	  and	  maintained.	  	  
	  
The	  study	  chooses	  a	  broad	  and	  innovative	  approach	  to	  shed	  clarity	  on	  the	  subject,	  and	  the	  
very	  different	  types	  of	  data	  are	  interpreted	  through	  a	  range	  of	  theoretical	  frames.	  Inspired	  
loosely	   by	   political	   ecology	   and	   political	   economy,	   the	   frames	   include	   hydro-­‐politics,	  
International	   Relations,	   discourse	   theory,	   and	   international	   law.	   The	   study	   rejects	   the	  
‘environmental	   determinist’	   approach,	   to	   situate	   the	   contestation	  over	   the	   transboundary	  
flows	   instead	  as	   shaped	  by	   the	  broader	  political	   context.	  Water	   is	   part	   and	  parcel	   of	   that	  
context,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  ascribed	  too	  much	  (nor	  too	  little)	  political	  importance.	  The	  Upper	  
Jordan	  River	  conflict	  should	  be	  understood,	  in	  other	  words,	  as	  shaping	  and	  being	  shaped	  by	  
(but	  not	  driving)	   the	   conflict	  between	   the	   states	  and	  peoples	  of	   Lebanon,	   Syria	  and	   Israel	  
(and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  of	  Jordan,	  and	  the	  West	  Bank	  and	  Gaza).	  	  
	  
The	  research	  team’s	  fluency	  in	  Arabic,	  Hebrew,	  French	  and	  English	  has	  enabled	  it	  access	  to	  
and	   interpretation	   of	   previously	   un-­‐examined	   or	   under-­‐examined	   data.	   This	   has	   led	   to	  
exploration	  of	   the	  archives	  of	   the	  French	  and	  British	  authorities	   that	   ruled	   Lebanon,	   Syria	  
and	   Palestine,	   reconciliation	   of	   both	   Lebanese	   and	   Israeli	   river	   flow	   data,	   exploration	   of	  
Lebanese	  and	  Israeli	  newspapers,	  and	  unpublished	  reports	  by	  authorities	  on	  these	  sides	  of	  
the	  Upper	  Jordan	  River.	  	  
	  
The	   research	   scrutinises	   the	   location	   and	   flows	   of	   the	   main	   Hasbani,	   Liddan	   and	   Banias	  
upper	  tributaries,	  confirming	  that	  the	  basin	  and	  recharge	  area	  of	  each	  are	  international.	  Six	  
decades	  of	  flow	  measured	  just	  upstream	  of	  their	  confluence	  shows	  that	  the	  Liddan	  is	  by	  far	  
the	   largest	   (about	  240	  million	  cubic	  metres	  per	  year	   (MCM/y))	  and	  the	  most	  stable	  of	   the	  
Upper	   Jordan	   River	   sources.	   The	   Hasbani	   and	   Banias	   flow	   about	   half	   as	   strong,	   and	   are	  
highly	  variable	  throughout	  the	  year.	  Most	  of	  the	  flows	  of	  all	  the	  tributaries	  discharge	  from	  
springs	  which	  are	  fed	  by	  groundwater	  from	  transboundary	  aquifers	  recharged	  by	  the	  snow	  
and	   rains	   of	   the	   Israeli-­‐occupied	   Syrian	  Golan,	   or	   by	   the	   slopes	   of	  Mount	  Hermon.	   These	  
have	  been	  very	  roughly	  estimated	  here	  at	  250	  –	  350	  million	  cubic	  metres	  per	  year	  (MCM/y).	  	  
	  
As	  the	  figure	  below	  shows,	  the	  struggle	  for	  use	  of	  and	  control	  over	  these	  flows	  began	  with	  
the	   carving	   up	   of	   the	   land	   by	   British	   and	   French	   forces,	   following	   their	   conquest	   of	   the	  
Ottoman	   empire.	   Zionist	   lobbying	   to	   include	  much	   of	   the	   Jordan	   River	   sources	   as	   part	   of	  
British	  Mandate	   Palestine	   succeeded	   in	   1921,	   though	   continued	  pressure	   in	   the	   following	  
decades	  for	  the	  Litani	  River	  did	  not.	  The	  contestation	  turned	  much	  more	  physical	  after	  the	  
1948	  nakba	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel,	  when	  the	  construction	  and	  destruction	  of	  
grand	   water	   master	   plans	   and	   projects	   took	   centre	   stage	   of	   the	   inter-­‐state	   wars.	   Israeli	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control	  of	  the	  flows	  was	  assured	  following	  its	  military	  conquest	  of	  the	  Syrian	  Golan	  in	  1967,	  
and	   invasion	  of	  Lebanon	   in	  1978	   (and	  subsequent	  occupation	  until	  2000).	  Since	   that	   time,	  
Israel	  has	  used	  essentially	  all	  of	  the	  Upper	  Jordan	  Flows,	  Lebanon	  about	  1%,	  and	  Syria	  none.	  	  
	  
The	  distribution	  by	   Israel	  has	  been	  maintained	  even	  following	   its	  withdrawal	  from	  most	  of	  
Lebanon	  in	  2000.	  As	  it	  still	  occupies	  the	  Syrian	  Golan	  (including	  parts	  of	  Mount	  Hermon),	  the	  
town	  of	  Ghajar	  and	   the	  Cheba’a	  Farms,	   Israel	   retains	  complete	   territorial	   control	  over	   the	  
sources	   and	   surface	   recharge	   area	   of	   two	   of	   the	   three	   tributaries	   –	   the	   Liddan	   and	   the	  
Banias.	  	  
	  
Lebanon’s	   construction	   of	   the	   Wazzani	   pumping	   station	   on	   the	   Hasbani	   River	   in	   2002	  
suggests	   that	   Israel’s	   relinquishment	  of	   the	   territory	  of	   the	  upper	  Hasbani	   led	   to	  a	   loss	  of	  
control	  of	  the	  flows.	  The	  research	  finds	  that	  reaction	  of	  the	  Israeli	  side	  (threatening	  war,	  and	  
prompting	  international	  mediation)	  has	  served	  to	  re-­‐assert	  control	  of	  the	  flows,	  however,	  by	  
deterring	   any	   future	   Lebanese	   development	   of	   the	   river.	   This	   leads	   to	   one	   the	   study’s	  
several	  implications	  for	  theory:	  that	  the	  control	  of	  upstream	  flows	  can	  be	  achieved	  without	  
the	  need	  for	  control	  of	  the	  territory,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  figure	  below.	  	  
	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  flows	  of	  the	  Upper	  Jordan	  River	  are	  today	  not	  of	  critical	  importance	  to	  the	  
survival	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.	  The	  tributaries	  are	  the	  main	  source	  to	  the	  Lake	  of	  Tiberias,	  and	  
provide	  about	  one-­‐sixth	  of	   total	   freshwater	  produced	   in	   Israel	   (one-­‐third,	   if	  evaporation	   is	  
not	  counted).	  The	  flows	  are	  used	  for	   industrial	  agriculture	  to	  produce	  cash	  export	  crops	   in	  
the	   Negev	   desert,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   domestic	   consumption.	   Considering	   this	   use	   of	   precious	  
resources	   together	   with	   current	   Israeli	   levels	   of	   food	   imports	   and	   desalination	   capacity,	  
there	   are	  more	   rationale	   alternatives.	   Thus,	  while	   the	   continued	   Israeli	   occupation	   of	   the	  
Cheba’a	   Farms	   and	   Ghajar	   may	   be	   or	   have	   been	   partly	   about	   ensuring	   continued	   water	  
flows,	   it	   should	   also	   be	   interpreted	   alongside	   the	   more	   important	   religious	   and	   military	  
motives.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   same	  way,	   the	   study	   concludes	   that	   control	   of	   the	   Litani	  was	   not	   one	   of	   the	  main	  
motives	  of	   the	   Israeli	   invasions	  of	   Lebanon	   in	  1978,	   1982	  and	  2006.	  Water	   resources	   and	  
water	   infrastructure	  certainly	  have	  been	  targets	   in	  these	  wars,	  however,	  and	  are	  routinely	  
used	  as	   tools	   to	  wage	   them.	  Deliberate	  or	   indiscriminate	   Israeli	  damage	  of	  over	  50	  public	  
water	   reservoirs	   in	   southern	   Lebanon	   in	   2006	   have	   proven	   not	   only	   violations	   of	  
International	  Humanitarian	  Law,	  but	  effective	  means	  of	  clearing	  civilians	  from	  their	  homes,	  
and	   of	   preventing	   their	   return.	   The	   2006	   war	   also	   served	   to	   re-­‐enforce	   the	   ‘hydro-­‐
hegemony’	   that	   Israel	   has	   maintained	   over	   the	   transboundary	   flows	   –	   by	   degrading	   and	  
deterring	  any	  further	  Lebanese	  development	  of	  the	  Hasbani.	  	  
	  
The	  great	  political,	  military	  and	  financial	  costs	  Israeli	  governments	  have	  incurred	  to	  achieve	  
and	   maintain	   essentially	   exclusive	   use	   of	   the	   Upper	   Jordan	   flows	   is	   not	   matched	   by	   the	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relatively	   slight	   importance	   of	   these	   to	   state	   security.	   The	   disconnect	   is	   explained	   in	   part	  
through	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   perceptions	   of	   the	   water	   conflict.	   Maintenance	   of	   the	  
established	  order	  through	  violent	  acts	  (hard	  power)	  is	  found	  to	  be	  supplemented	  through	  a	  
number	  of	  narratives	  and	  discourses	  (soft	  power).	  The	  most	  dominant	  of	  these	  latter	  is	  the	  
Israeli	  discourse	   linking	   the	   transboundary	   flows	  with	   Israeli	   state	  security,	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  
constructed	   narratives	   of	   scarcity	   and	   of	   strategic	   territory.	   The	   link	   appears	   firmly	  
established	   across	   the	   Israeli	   political	   spectrum,	   and	   is	   found	   to	   have	   influenced	  
international	  mediators	  during	  the	  2002	  Wazzani	  Springs	  dispute.	  	  
	  
The	   efforts	   of	   the	   international	   diplomatic	   community	   during	   the	   Wazzani	   and	   earlier	  
disputes	   are	   found	   to	   be	  more	   concerned	   at	   not	   upsetting	   the	   established	  order,	   than	   at	  
addressing	   the	   root	   causes	   of	   conflict.	   By	   focussing	   on	  managing	   the	  water	   conflict,	   they	  
have	  missed	  opportunities	  to	  begin	  to	  resolve	  it,	  thereby	  smoothing	  concerns	  on	  one	  side	  of	  
the	   border	   while	   raising	   them	   on	   the	   other.	   Such	   efforts	   also	   yield	   to	   the	   temptation	   of	  
incoherently	  dividing	  the	  Jordan	  River	  Basin	  into	  its	  upper	  and	  lower	  sub-­‐basins.	  Diplomatic	  
efforts	  focussed	  on	  the	  Jordan’s	  lower	  reaches	  are	  ultimately	  compromised	  by	  ignoring	  the	  
tensions	  over	   the	   source	  of	   the	   flows,	  while	  upstream	  activity	   cannot	  be	   (and	  evidently	   is	  
not)	  disregarded	  by	  downstream	  riparians.	  This	  study	  itself	  succumbs	  to	  the	  artificial	  division	  
by	  focussing	  on	  the	  Upper	  Jordan,	  but	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  situating	  it	  within	  the	  
entire	  Jordan	  River	  Basin.	  	  
	  
Potential	   sources	   of	   future	   violent	   conflict	   identified	   may	   come	   about	   through	  
transboundary	   pollution,	   extensive	   groundwater	   development,	   or	   plans	   to	   construct	  
reservoirs.	  Efforts	   to	  predict	  any	  such	  outbreaks	  should	   first	  consider	   the	  broader	  political	  
context,	   which	   will	   continue	   to	   shape,	   for	   instance,	   whether	   wastewater	   re-­‐use	   and	  
desalination	  technology	  will	  be	  used	  by	  either	  side	  to	  maintain	  or	  reduce	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
water	  conflict.	   In	  between	  the	  destructive	  bouts	  of	  war,	   the	   lower	   intensity	  chronic	  water	  
conflict	  continues,	  with	  its	  effects	  felt	  chiefly	  in	  Lebanon.	  Should	  shifts	  in	  power	  or	  relations	  
allow	  it,	  just	  resolution	  of	  the	  water	  conflict	  could	  be	  swift	  indeed.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  study	  re-­‐
emphasises	   that	   tensions	   over	   the	   Upper	   Jordan	   River	   will	   not	   disappear	   unless	   analysis	  
considers,	  and	  diplomatic	  efforts	  confront,	  the	  asymmetry	  in	  transboundary	  water	  use	  and	  
distribution	  throughout	  the	  basin.	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